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RESEARCH ARTICLE 
Felix Boecking, Monika Scholz 
Did the Nationalist Government Manipulate the 
Chinese Bond Market? A Quantitative 
Perspective on Short-Term Price Fluctuations of 
Domestic Government Bonds, 1932–1934 
 
Abstract  Based on a newly constructed set of data, this paper offers a 
quantitative perspective on the Nationalist Government’s relations with China’s 
domestic bond markets during the period 1932–34. For all the recent revisionist 
scholarship on the achievements of Nationalist state-building, the perception of 
the Nationalist elite as corrupt is still widely accepted. In order to demonstrate 
the empirical potential of quantitative financial history, this paper tests one 
particular assertion: that members of the Nationalist elite manipulated the issue 
price of domestic government bonds in order to enrich themselves and their 
associates. We test this by calculating two price data correlations: that of a first 
sample of government bonds, all of them issued before 1932, and that of a 
second sample of government bonds, which includes bonds issued during the 
period under review. The price fluctuations of the first sample are correlated with 
each other to a much higher degree than those of the second sample. This 
indicates that the prices of bonds in the first sample were reacting similarly to the 
same range of influences, while the bonds issued during the period under review 
and included in the second sample were displaying individual price fluctuations. 
One possible explanation for this is that members of the Nationalist elites 
enriched themselves or their associates by issuing domestic government bonds at 
artificially low prices. In sum, the article illustrates both the potential and the 
limitations of quantitative history: it allows us to test and dismiss a precisely 
formulated hypothesis about Nationalist corruption, but it is only one possible 
way in which statistical analysis can be applied and does not cover the whole 
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realm of state practices. 
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Introduction 
The research presented in this article attempts to bring a new, quantitative 
dimension to the study of the Chinese Nationalist party-state, which dominated the 
politics of China from the mid-1920s until the late 1940s. Many studies seek the 
roots for the 1949 demise of the mainland government of the Chinese Nationalist 
Party of Chiang Kai-shek, the Guomindang (hereafter GMD), in the pre-war 
policies of the Nationalist state. The purpose of this article is not to dispute that 
Nationalist fiscal policy proved unsustainable in the long term. Rather, the authors 
use a newly compiled data set of the prices of Nationalist Government bonds 
traded on the Shanghai Stock Exchange to gain a more in-depth understanding of 
the relations between bondholders and the Nationalist Government during the 
early 1930s. In order to illustrate the potential of quantitative evidence for the 
study of Nationalist China, this article considers the question of whether the 
Nationalist Government manipulated the market in domestic government bonds. 
This study is based, first of all, on the relationship between the fluctuation in the 
prices of Chinese government bonds and the confidence that the Nationalist 
Government’s fiscal policy inspired. As William N. Goetzmann, Andrey D. Ukhov 
and Zhu Ning point out in a study of Chinese government bonds traded on the 
London Stock Exchange, “the rationale for market reactions to news from major 
political events is based on the presumption that the likelihood of payment on the 
security fluctuates with the political and military events affecting the issuing 
authority.”1 That connection was also noted by the earlier study of Douglas 
Paauw, who noted in his highly pessimistic assessment of Nationalist fiscal policy 
that it was “paradoxical that […] the confidence of foreign governments in 
Nanking finance increased during this period of fiscal demoralization in China,” 
since prices of Chinese bonds held abroad rose between 1933 and 1937.2  
Subsequent scholarship was dominated until the 1990s by the views of Lloyd E. 
Eastman, who argued that “the [Nationalist] regime […] valued the urban 
economy, but as a source of revenue; it devoted little attention to the problems of 
economic development.” 3  Because the Nationalist government was more 
concerned with raising revenue than considering the effects of the means by which 
                                                             
1 William N. Goetzmann, Andrey D. Ukhov, and Ning Zhu, “China and the World Financial 
Markets 1870–1939: Modern Lessons from Historical Globalization,” 278.  
2 Douglas Paauw, “Chinese National Expenditures during the Nanking Period,” 10.  
3 Lloyd E. Eastman, The Abortive Revolution: China under Nationalist Rule, 1927–1937, 228. 
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revenue was raised, it relied on borrowing to an unsustainable extent. In Eastman’s 
phrase, “the policy of borrowing had […] become a Frankenstein’s monster that 
threatened to kill its own creator.”4 More recently, Julia Strauss has pointed to the 
achievements of Nationalist fiscal policy in widening the regime’s tax base during 
the Nanjing decade, and Margherita Zanasi has demonstrated that the economy 
was a key part of the Guomindang’s efforts to modernize China.5 With regard to 
the wartime period, Hans van de Ven has demonstrated the Nationalists’ relative 
success in terms of wartime economic mobilization, given the state of China’s 
economy on the eve of war in 1937.6 Despite the recent revisionist trend in 
scholarship, the idea that members of the Nationalist elite benefitted from insider 
information in taking advantage of the price fluctuations of domestic government 
bonds is still widely accepted.7 It is this assertion which we test in this article, to 
consider the potential of quantitative evidence in studying the history of 
Nationalist China. 
In the first section of this article, Boecking explains the role of bonds within 
Nationalist fiscal policy. In the second section, Boecking and Scholz analyze the 
weekly dynamics of the price fluctuations of Chinese Government domestic 
bonds for the period 1932–34. Based on Goetzmann, Ukhov and Zhu’s statement 
that bond prices respond to bondholders’ expectations about the political future 
of the issuing government, we analyze the correlation of weekly price 
fluctuations of domestically traded Chinese Government bonds, using a newly 
constructed set of bond price data, calculating two correlations: that of a first 
sample of government bonds, all of them issued before 1932, and that of a 
second sample of government bonds, which includes bonds issued during the 
period under review. We use a series of bond prices rather than bond yields since, 
at the present point of our research, we have not yet calculated the yield for each 
bond, due to the complications in doing so presented by the debt consolidations 
of 1932 and 1936, and the frequent changes in the interest rates paid. The 
timeframe of our case study is 1932–34, which is the timeframe of the original 
data run in the North China Herald. Also, this timeframe predates the 
nationalization of the major commercial banks in spring 1935, after which the 
Nationalist Government was in a position to impose mandatory bond sales, thus 
distorting the signaling effect of bond prices as indicators of the opinion of 
bondholders of the political future of the Nationalist Government. Both the time 
frame and the source of data distinguishes our study from the recent article by 
                                                             
4 Ibid., 232. 
5 Julia Strauss, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities: State Building in Republican China, 
1927–1940; Margherita Zanasi, Saving the Nation: Economic Modernity in Republican China. 
6 Hans van de Ven, War and Nationalism in China, 1925–1945.  
7 Parks M. Coble, The Shanghai Capitalists and the Nationalist Government, 1927–1937, 234; 
Chun-yu Ho, Dan Li, “A Mirror of History: China’s Bond Market, 1921–1942,” 413. 
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Chun-yu Ho and Dan Li, who study the time period from 1921 to 1942 based on 
data published in Shenbao, concluding that “civil conflicts did not matter a lot in 
the financial market.”8 
In the third section, Boecking considers several possible explanations for the 
type of fluctuations observed in the first sample, concluding that changes in 
China’s foreign and security policy environment accounted for more downward 
trends in domestic government bond prices—and by extension losses in political 
confidence—during the period observed than the Nationalist Government’s fiscal 
policy per se. During the Nanjing decade, the making of fiscal policy and foreign 
and security policy were intertwined for the Nationalist Government in Nanjing. 
Foreign governments dealing with the Nationalists paid close attention to the 
prices of Chinese Government bonds traded on foreign and domestic capital 
markets. Such were the absurdities arising from the presence of informal empire 
in China before the second Sino-Japanese War that, until January 1939, the 
Nationalist Government serviced its foreign financial obligations, including those 
to Japan, a country with which it was at war (albeit an undeclared war).9 In the 
fourth section, Boecking considers the implications of our findings based on data 
from the years 1932 to 1934 for a study of Nationalist fiscal policy during the 
entire Nanjing decade.  
Government Bonds within Nationalist Fiscal Policy 
When the Nationalist Government established its capital in Nanjing in 1927, 
borrowing abroad was not a feasible option for raising new government revenue 
due to earlier defaults by successive republican governments in Beijing.10 Instead, 
the Nationalists used new tax revenue, chiefly tariff revenue, which had increased 
significantly after the Nationalists regained tariff autonomy in 1929 (see Fig.1), as 
a source of funds for amortization with regard to foreign loans, and as both a 
source of amortization and security for domestic loans.11 Using revenue to finance 
borrowing can be interpreted in different ways; either as a fiscally responsible way 
of maximizing government expenditure while also providing a low-risk, 
low-interest investment or as a means of addressing short-term financial 
obligations at the cost of using future government revenue to pay bondholders, 
                                                             
8 Ibid., 429. 
9 Felix Boecking, “Unmaking the Nationalist State: Administrative Reform among Fiscal 
Collapse, 1937–1945,” 283–84.  
10 Arthur N. Young, China’s Nation-Building Effort, 1927–1937: The Financial and Economic 
Record, 92. 
11 W.A. Thomas, Western Capitalism in China: a History of the Shanghai Stock Exchange, 
247. 
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thus redistributing government revenue in favour of bond-holders.12  Overall, 
Nationalist debt management until 1937 was successful. Two-thirds of 
government deficit represented payments to retire earlier debt;13 by 1937, only 
10% of China’s national debt was in arrears, compared to 50% in 1928.14  
 
 
Fig.1  Relation of Combined Maritime and Native Customs Revenue to China’s Foreign 
Loans and Indemnities (in £)15 
 
Foreign bondholders’ perception of the Nationalist Government’s fiscal policies 
is illustrated by a look at the yields of Nationalist Government bonds traded abroad, 
which areis the most common indicator of bond price fluctuations. The current 
yield of bonds is calculated by dividing annual interest payable by the price at 
which the bonds are being traded.16 Thus, the lower the price at which the bonds 
are being sold, the higher the yield. In 1927, “the approximate range of yields of 
leading foreign loans [traded on the London Stock Exchange] was: The 1898 Loan 
at 4 ½ percent (customs-secured), 7 to 11 per cent; Reorganization Loan of 1913 
(customs-secured), 9 to 12 per cent; and Shanghai-Nanking Railway Loan of 1903, 
11 to 15 per cent.”17 By 1937 “the 1898 Loan with a 1943 final maturity sold in 
London on a 3¾ per cent basis; the 1913 Reorganization Loan with 1960 final 
maturity yielded 4.9 per cent; the Crisp Loan of 1912 with 1952 maturity yielded 
5.2 per cent; and the Shanghai-Nanking Railway Loan of 1903 with maturity 
                                                             
12 Jan de Vriess, Adrian van der Woude, The First Modern Economy: Success, Failure and 
Perseverance of the Dutch Economy 1500–1815, 115. 
13 Young, China’s Nation-Building Effort, 149. 
14 Ibid., 141. 
15 Statistical Department, Inspectorate General of Customs, The Trade of China, 1938: 
Introductory Survey with Tables for Revenue, Value, Treasure and Shipping, 110. This figure 
was prepared by Madeline Graham based on data provided by Felix Boecking. 
16 Frank J. Fabozzi, Bond Markets, Analysis and Strategies, 37. 
17 Young, China’s Nation-Building Effort, 98–99.  
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yielded 6 per cent.”18 The increase in Chinese Government bond prices (expressed 
by the fall in current yields) clearly indicates that by 1937 investors on the London 
Stock Exchange had more confidence in the Nationalist Government’s fiscal 
policy than they had had in 1927. This increase in confidence can at least partly be 
explained by the increase in Customs revenue, which provided a greater margin of 
safety for interest and principal payments being met. The fact that payment of 
interest and principal on foreign loans was only suspended in January 1939 
indicates that the foreign bondholders’ confidence was not misplaced.  
At the same time, as Table 1 demonstrates, the percentage of deficit covered by 
borrowing, having reached a low of 12% in 1933, had exceeded the 1929 deficit 
percentage by 1937. Under the Nationalist Government, domestic bond issue 
increased significantly. Between 1927 and 1935, the Nationalist Government 
issued C$1,636 million worth of domestic bonds, or C$182 million each year on 
average. This compared to a total domestic bond issue of C$612 million, or 
C$38.3 million annually on average issued by successive Republican governments 
between 1911 and 1927.19 The increase in domestic borrowing was helped by the 
bank coup of spring 1935, in which the Nationalist Government brought the Bank 
of China and the Bank of Communications, China’s two largest banks back under 
central government control by forcing them to purchase large amounts of 
government bonds with the receipts of which the Nationalists then purchased 
majority shares in these two banks.20 Thereafter, the Nationalist Government was 
in a much stronger position to place government bonds. 
 
Table 1  Expenditures, Revenues and Deficits of the National Government, 1929–3721 
Year ending 
June 30th 
Expenditure  
excluding balances 
at end of the 
period, millions of 
yuan 
Revenue, unborrowed, 
excluding balances at 
beginning of the 
period, millions of 
yuan 
Deficit covered by borrowing 
Amount, millions 
of yuan 
Percentage of 
expenditure 
929 434 334 100 23.0 
1930 585 484 101 17.3 
1931 775 558 217 28.0 
1932 749 619 130 17.4 
1933 699 614 86 12.3 
1934 836 689 147 17.6 
1935 941 745 196 20.8 
1936 1,073 817 256 23.8 
1937 1,167 870 297 25.4 
                                                             
18 Ibid., 101–2. 
19 Linsun Cheng, Banking in Modern China: Entrepreneurs, Professional Managers, and the 
Development of Chinese Banks, 1897–1937, 116. 
20 Ibid., 99. 
21 Jonathan Spence, The Search for Modern China, 349. 
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But allowance must also be made for the organic growth of China’s domestic 
bond market, and for the Nationalist Government’s role in fostering this growth. 
This process began much later in China than in Europe and North America. Hans 
van de Ven has pointed out that the Qing imperial Chinese state only began to issue 
bonds at a late point compared to Western states. 22  The imperial Chinese 
government attempted to raise revenue from domestic bonds in the 1890s, but 
failed to raise significant amounts.23 Unlike Western European states, therefore, 
China possessed no tradition of government bonds as conservative, dependable 
investments for small private investors. The Chinese bond market began to 
develop in the 1910s, when the new Republican government in Beijing turned 
again to domestic investors in order to avoid the political complications of relying 
on foreign loans.24 Government securities became the “main business of the 
securities exchanges”25 after the stock market crash of 1922 diminished investor 
confidence in joint stock companies and share trading, and bonds became a more 
attractive investment.26 The lack of alternative investment opportunities on the 
securities exchanges no doubt was a contributing factor in the development of a 
speculative market in Chinese bonds. According to Young, the market in domestic 
government bonds in Shanghai grew after the Nationalists moved their capital to 
Nanjing in 1927 because banks bought bonds as part of their reserve requirement, 
advanced cash against government bonds, and bought bonds on their own account 
as investment.27 The fact that a large part of domestic government bonds were 
held by Chinese banks even before the banking coup of 1935 meant that the banks 
themselves accounted for a large part of the continuingly growing volume of bond 
sales.28  
Linsun Cheng characterizes the bond market of the Nationalist pre-war period 
as “highly sensitive and speculative.”29 Bond prices were affected, at various 
times, by seasonal fluctuations in the Shanghai financial market, changes in the 
political situation, natural disasters, exchange rate fluctuations and the actions of 
major speculators. To give but one example; the Japanese attack on Shanghai in 
late 1931 and early 1932 led to a 50% fall in the prices of major government 
bonds.30 Not all banks viewed the Nationalist Government as fiscally reliable. 
The management of the Shanghai Commercial and Savings Bank 上海商业储蓄
                                                             
22 van de Ven, “Military and Financial Reform in the late Qing and Early Republic,” 35. 
23 Thomas, Western Capitalism in China, 248. 
24 Ibid., 247. 
25 Andrea McElderry, Shanghai Securities Exchanges: Past and Present, 4. 
26 McElderry, Shanghai Securities Exchanges, 15. 
27 Young, China’s Nation-Building Effort, 93. 
28 Coble, The Shanghai Capitalists and the Nationalist Government, 1927–1937, 76. 
29 Cheng, Banking in Modern China, 124. 
30 Ibid., 124. 
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银行, one of Shanghai’s most important private banks, argued in 1934 that the 
bank “should not make a lot of government loans since [it was] a commercial 
bank.” Such government loans as were to be made had to be based on “scrutiny 
of the government’s financial situation […] conducted in advance”; the 
feasibility of the loan had to be “based on the government’s financial credit,” and 
the “fluidity and ease of disposal [of the loans] had to be kept.”31  
That this concern was justified was demonstrated by the debt consolidations of 
the Nationalist Government. Debt consolidation, in this case, is a euphemism for 
partial default, since the 1932 debt consolidation was based on cutting interest 
rates and extending the amortization period of existing loans. Again, in 1936, 
debt consolidation meant that the amortization period of existing loans was 
extended. In the 1932 debt consolidation, security for internal loans was 
transferred from salt monopoly revenue and unspecified other internal revenues 
to tariff revenue.32 Despite two partial defaults within the space of four years, 
domestic bond prices began to rise again in 1937 following the latter, not least 
because the Nationalist Government had issued no new domestic bonds since the 
1936 debt consolidation. The average current yield of domestic bonds in June 
1937 was 8.7% compared to 11.6% in 1936, 24.4% in 1932 and 17.3% in 1928.33 
From the government’s point of view, using the expanding domestic bond market 
was a way of legitimately financing its deficit without resorting to excessive 
indirect taxation, or irregular levies. In increasing domestic bond issue, the 
Nationalists relied on their partial control over the banking sector to place bond 
issues; however, the subsequent development of bond prices demonstrates that, 
despite this measure of coercion, the government did not destroy public 
confidence in the bond market permanently. In both the 1932 and the 1936 
internal debt consolidations, tariff revenue was used as a security. Increased tariff 
revenue (see Fig.1) together with the precedent of tariff revenue having been 
used as a security for debt consolidation in 1922 suggested a margin of safety for 
meeting the cost of China’s domestic obligations.34  
The government’s perceived competence in managing its fiscal affairs was also 
important in creating public trust in Guomindang monetary policy. Niv Horesh has 
argued for the “efficacy of the Kuomintang’s monetary policy,” based on the 
Nationalists’ success in ending private banknote issue in 1935, and limiting the 
influence of foreign banks on the Chinese banking market.35 Because money 
                                                             
31 Shanghai Shangye Chuxu Yinhang, “Benhang zhengfu jiekuan zhi yanjiu (Study of our 
Bank’s government loans),” December 1934, SHCS file, No.1625; in Cheng, 134.  
32 Young, China’s Nation-Building Record, 104–8. 
33 Ibid., 99. 
34 Thomas, Western Capitalism in China, 250. 
35 Niv Horesh, “‘Many a Long Day’: HSBC and Its Note Issue in Republican China, 
1912–1935,” 38.  
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“issued by organizations such as banks and governments relies on impersonal trust 
in these organizations, as well as trust that society in general will accept the tokens 
produced by those organizations,”36 the Nationalists had to demonstrate fiscal 
competence in order to create public confidence in their currency. In analyzing 
relations between the state and the banking sector in Republican-era Tianjin, Brett 
Sheehan concludes that, in extending loans, “Tianjin’s modern bankers sought 
stable government institutions with the legitimacy to commit verifiable sources of 
revenue to the banks in return for loans.”37 Taking the exchange rates of the new 
Chinese currency introduced in 1935 as an indication of public confidence, these 
rates remained stable as long as the money supply remained constant, and the 
government deficit was sustainable. Once the Nationalist Government resorted to 
issuing insufficiently backed currency during the second Sino-Japanese War, 
public confidence in the new currency, which had also been damaged by Japanese 
currency warfare, decreased, and exchange rates declined. As Horesh points out, 
“statehood, nation building and monetary reform were inextricably interwoven in 
Republican China.”38 In 1935, the Nationalists’ efforts to retire or restructure 
public debt, rather than repudiating it, as well as the mid-term increase in 
government revenue through the increase in tariff revenue, facilitated the 
beginnings of a territorial currency, and thus contributed to the Nationalist 
state-building project.  
The Correlation of Price Fluctuations of Domestic Bonds, 
1932–34 
Having demonstrated the importance of bonds within Nationalist fiscal policy, 
we analyze the degree to which price fluctuations of individual domestic 
government bonds are correlated with each other, calculating two correlations: 
that of a first sample of government bonds, all of them issued before 1932, and 
that of a second sample of government bonds, which includes bonds issued 
during the period under review. If the Nationalist Government had issued bonds 
at artificially low prices to benefit its associates, we would expect to find a low 
degree of correlation between individual bond issues in the second sample, which 
contains all bonds contained in the first sample as well as bonds issued during the 
period under review, with anomalous price movements of individual bonds, as 
bonds issued at an artificially low price quickly approached market valuation. 
Similarly, if there had been insider information pertaining to the price movement 
                                                             
36 Brett Sheehan, Trust in Troubled Times: Money, Banks, and State-Society Relations in 
Republican Tianjin, 5. 
37 Ibid., 150.  
38 Horesh, “‘Many a Long Day’,” 37.  
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of individual bonds available to members of the Nationalist elite, we would 
expect to find anomalous price movements of individual bonds, and a low degree 
of correlation.  
The quantitative analysis contained in this section is based on the historic 
current-month closing prices of fourteen Nationalist government bonds traded on 
the Shanghai Stock Exchange, printed at regular intervals in the North China 
Herald, the weekly edition of the North China Daily News. The first sample 
contains eleven bond issues, the second sample fourteen. These data were 
collected by Boecking from microfilmed copies of the North China Herald held 
at the Widener Library at Harvard University. The price data were published in 
an English-language paper for a bilingual readership,39 based on data provided 
by a Shanghai stock broking firm. The interval for our quantitative analysis was 
determined by the availability of published data in the North China Herald; for 
the purposes of this article, we chose the calendar years 1932, 1933, and 1934. 
This section is the product of collaborative work. Scholz visualized the data 
provided by Boecking as graphs and conducted the quantitative analysis. 
The quantitative analysis done for this article is the first part of a two-part 
study that will eventually cover the entire Nanjing decade. In this article, we 
demonstrate that from 1932 to 1934, the fluctuations of Chinese Government 
domestic bonds were correlated to a significant degree, based on Scholz’s 
calculations of the Pearson correlation coefficient. Scholz calculated the Pearson 
correlation coefficient for all fourteen bonds for all three years. Where data for 
one particular bond are missing for one particular date, that data point was 
excluded from the calculation of the correlation coefficient. The correlation 
coefficient was tabulated (cf. Table 2), and the validity of the use of the Pearson 
correlation coefficient was determined by a chi-square test, which was used to 
ascertain how close the data are to a Gaussian normal distribution. The results of 
the chi-square test showed that the data are well within the permissible scope of 
the use of the Pearson correlation coefficient. The Pearson correlation coefficient 
shows a significant correlation (i.e. > 0.9) of price fluctuations for 53.85% of all 
fourteen bonds. If the bonds for which data are not reported for the entire time 
window are not included in this calculation, the Pearson correlation coefficient 
shows a significant correlation for 87.9% of the bonds.  
For the purposes of this study, we are interested in the degree of correlation 
between the fluctuations of the prices of different Chinese Government bonds 
traded on the Shanghai Stock Exchange. Therefore, Scholz normalized the data 
before visualizing them: each data point is expressed as a fraction of the highest 
value for each bond. Scholz also depicted the fluctuations of the normalized bond 
prices in one graph for the entire time window (See Fig. 2). 
                                                             
39 I am grateful to Rudolf Wagner for this point. 
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Table 2  Correlation among Chinese National Government Domestic Bond Prices 
193234, tabulated 
 18th Year 
Customs 
Reorganization Disbandment 19th Year 
Customs 
Rehabilitation 
Reorganization 0.963     
Disbandment 0.926 0.976    
19th Year 
Customs 
0.988 0.973 0.935   
Rehabilitation 0.962 0.996 0.976 0.973  
20th Year 
Tobacco 
0.951 0.997 0.986 0.964 0.996 
20th Year 
Customs 
0.939 0.995 0.981 0.954 0.993 
Consolidated 
Tax 
0.930 0.991 0.986 0.944 0.990 
Salt Revenue 0.930 0.991 0.986 0.943 0.990 
20th Year 
Currency 
0.571 0.778 0.740 0.762 0.686 
6 % 
Consolidated 
0.878 0.974 0.986 0.889 0.963 
22nd Year 
Customs 
0.317 0.835 0.677 0.894 0.907 
23rd Year 
Customs 
0.396 0.741 0.773 0.765 0.736 
96 Millions 0.494 0.537 0.632 0.486 0.444 
 20th Year 
Tobacco 
20th Year 
Customs 
Consolidated 
Tax 
Salt 
Revenue 
20th Year 
Currency 
20th Year 
Customs 
0.997     
Consolidated 
Tax 
0.996 0.998    
Salt Revenue 0.996 0.998 1.00   
20th Year 
Currency 
0.837 0.882 0.775 0.755  
6 % 
Consolidated 
0.982 0.980 0.987 0.986 0.603 
22nd Year 
Customs 
0.963 0.929 0.952 0.933 0.787 
23rd Year 
Customs 
0.738 0.731 0.826 0.814 0.803 
96 Millions 0.502 0.5481 0.664 0.634 0.638 
 6 % 
Consolidated 
22nd Year 
Customs 
23rd Year 
Customs 
  
22nd Year 
Customs 
0.655     
23rd Year 
Customs 
0.899 0.769    
96 Millions 0.926 0.538 0.854   
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Explaining Chinese Government Domestic Bond Price 
Fluctuations 
The statistically significant degree of correlation between the prices of different 
issues of Chinese government domestic bonds in the first sample suggests that 
prices of bonds issued before our window of observation were reacting to the 
same factors during this time. Within the second sample, correlation is much 
lower. One possible explanation is that, during the period under observation 
bonds were issued at artificially low prices to benefit the Nationalist 
Government’s associates. But what factors were the bonds within the first sample 
reacting to? This section considers two possibilities in terms of another type of 
correlation within the first sample: changes in foreign and security policy 
environment and changes in the Chinese National Dollar/Sterling and Chinese 
National Dollar/US Dollar exchange rates, which themselves were temporally 
correlated with changes in China’s foreign and security policy environment.  
The most significant change in China’s foreign policy and security 
environment during the Nanjing decade, the Japanese seizure of China’s three 
northeastern provinces, beginning in September 1931, immediately predates the 
period for which we currently have data. The Shanghai Incident, which lasted 
from January 28, 1932 until March 3, 1932, resulted in the close of the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange from the end of January 1932 until the beginning of May 1932. 
During this period, the Nationalist Government consolidated its debt through a 
partial default (see above), in a plan published on February 1, 1932. When bond 
trading on the Shanghai Stock Exchange reopened in early May 1932, bonds 
were traded at prices that were consistently higher than the closing prices before 
the suspension of trading on the Shanghai Stock Exchange in January 1932. Even 
a slight decline in summer 1932, arrested itself at a level higher than the January 
closing prices. Hence, the debt consolidation of February 1932 had not caused a 
decline in bond prices. After an increased in bond prices towards the end of the 
year, there followed a decline in January 1933, concurrent with the Japanese 
invasion of Rehe. By mid-February 1933, bond prices had started to recover, and, 
in the wake of the signing of the Tangku Truce between China and Japan, bond 
prices rose to a new high, which lasted until October 1933, when the resignation 
of Song Ziwen as finance minister, followed by an insurrection in Fujian 
Province against the Nationalist Government in Nanjing caused a decline of bond 
prices to the levels of July 1933. Once Song’s succession had been arranged, and 
the Fujian Incident resolved, bond prices continued to rise again, reaching new 
heights in summer 1934 (see Table 3). With the exception of Song Ziwen’s 
resignation, in which disagreements with Chiang Kai-shek played a large part, all 
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the major fluctuations in the prices of Chinese domestic government bonds 
traded on the Shanghai Stock Exchange during this period are closely correlated 
in time to changes in China’s foreign policy and security environment. 
 
Table 3  Foreign Exchange Rates, 1932–3440 
 £ (pence per Chinese $) US $ (cents per Chinese $) 
1932 High Low High Low 
January 16.77 15.96 23.77 22.96 
February 17.81 16.45 25.00 23.53 
March 16.72 14.57 24.28 22.75 
April 14.35 13.75 22.72 21.84 
May 14.39 13.69 21.93 20.71 
June 13.78 13.52 21.06 20.28 
July 13.93 13.33 20.51 19.64 
August 14.97 13.85 21.68 20.22 
September 14.99 14.38 21.66 20.61 
October 15.22 14.61 21.30 20.68 
November 15.36 15.00 21.13 19.71 
December 15.79 13.83 20.08 19.09 
1933 
January 14.45 14.13 20.42 19.66 
February 14.51 13.98 20.54 19.47 
March 14.84 14.21 21.77 20.20 
April 16.19 14.16 24.25 20.31 
May 15.50 14.50 25.13 24.06 
June 15.63 15.00 27.25 25.13 
July 15.63 14.88 31.00 27.94 
August 15.19 14.69 29.13 26.94 
September 15.50 15.25 30.94 28.44 
October 15.50 15.25 30.81 28.75 
November 15.56 15.13 34.31 31.25 
December 15.88 15.18 34.06 32.75 
1934 
January 16.44 16.00 34.69 33.06 
February 16.81 16.13 35.63 33.75 
(To be continued) 
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(Continued) 
 £ (pence per Chinese $) US $ (cents per Chinese $) 
1934 High Low High Low 
March 16.56 16.13 35.38 34.38 
April 16.25 15.31 35.00 32.94 
May 15.56 14.63 33.19 31.19 
June 16.25 15.50 34.25 32.50 
July 16.31 16.00 34.44 33.69 
August 16.88 16.13 35.44 33.88 
September 17.56 16.94 36.63 35.38 
October 18.50 15.69 37.88 32.38 
November 16.31 15.88 34.31 33.06 
December 16.94 16.31 34.88 33.75 
 
The same pattern of temporal correlation emerges from considering the 
Chinese National Dollar/Sterling and Chinese National Dollar/US Dollar 
exchange rates against the background of changes in China’s foreign and security 
policy environment. Both the sterling and the US Dollar value of the Chinese 
National Dollar are at their highest point of the time period under consideration 
following the end of the first Shanghai War in 1932. Following the resignation of 
Song Ziwen in October 1933 and the Fujian Insurrection, exchange values 
declined significantly at the end of 1933. While bond prices recovered in summer 
1934, the exchange value of the Chinese National Dollar did not. Broadly 
speaking, though, changes in the exchange value of the Chinese National Dollar, 
too, are correlated with changes in China’s foreign and security policy 
environment. 
Long-Term Implications 
Bonds were an important part of Nationalist fiscal policy, and the dynamics of 
price fluctuations suggest that Chinese government domestic bond prices reacted 
acutely to changes in China’s political and security environment. The significant 
degree of correlation which we found in the price fluctuations of different 
Chinese Government domestic bonds in the first sample, and the close temporal 
correlations of many of these fluctuations with changes in China’s foreign policy 
and security environment demonstrate that that environment was an important 
variable in determining bond price valuations during the period under discussion 
for bonds which had been issued prior to the period under observation. The lower 
degree of correlation between the price fluctuations of bonds contained within 
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the second sample, which also contains bonds issued during the period of 
observation, suggests that the Nationalist Government did indeed manipulate the 
market in domestic government bonds either by issuing new bonds at artificially 
low prices. 
Traditionally, the Nationalist Government’s fiscal and economic policy has 
been labeled as ineffective, if not insincere, or plainly exploitative. The evidence 
of bond price movements examined for this article suggests that the trajectory of 
Nationalist policy-making has to be more complex than that. The return to low 
yields after the debt consolidation of 1936 can be explained as consequence of 
the banking coup of spring 1935, with the nature of the bond market distorting 
the signaling effect, given that the government could instruct the Central Banking 
Group to buy bonds. The return to low yields after 1932 consolidation cannot be 
explained in the same way, given that it preceded the banking coup, and 
notwithstanding speculative bond purchases. This means that there has to be 
another reason for the return to low yields, and greater political confidence on the 
part of Chinese bondholders has to be considered as an explanation. The 
evidence presented here indicates that, until 1937, the Nationalists successfully 
used increased government revenue to maintain bondholders’ confidence both 
domestically and abroad, thus challenging the views of Paauw and others on the 
Republic of China’s “fiscal demoralization” at this time. 41 
While short-term fluctuations in the prices of Chinese Government-backed 
bonds traded on the Shanghai Stock Exchange were closely correlated 
temporarily with changes in China’s foreign and security policy environment, 
and while the evidence suggests that the Nationalist Government issued bonds at 
artificially low prices during the period from 1932 to 1934, these factors do not 
explain long-term price changes. In foreign and security policy terms, the 
Nationalist Government was in a precarious position in 1936, just as it had been 
in 1927, albeit for different reasons. The Xi’an incident of December 1936 
underscored the political divisions within the fragmented Nationalist polity. The 
Communist insurrection continued to threaten China’s political consensus in 
favour of military-backed authoritarian regimes. Large parts of the territory 
formerly controlled by the Qing state, as whose legitimate successor the 
Nationalist Government saw itself, were under the control of power-holders 
competing with the Nationalist Government. In 1936, there was a pronounced 
Japanese threat to China’s national security where there had been a position of 
ambivalence in 1927.  
 And yet, average current yields of Nationalist Government-backed bonds 
were lower than they had been in 1927. If we accept the hypothesis that bond 
prices reflect investor confidence, we have to identify another explanatory 
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variable to explain this development. One explanation is the fiscal policy that the 
Nationalist Government had pursued in the period between 1927 and 1936. This 
suggests that the Nationalist Government’s policy of fiscal realism and 
consolidation, backed by increasing tax revenue—chiefly tariff revenue—had 
paid off in terms of increasing bondholders’ confidence in the Nationalist 
Government’s fiscal policy, despite short-term changes in China’s foreign and 
security policy environment. Considering the years covered by our data in 
context, it seems that there was a window of opportunity for the Nationalist 
Government’s fiscal policy in 1932–34, when the deficit had reached its lowest 
point and yields were low. The timing of this is all the more surprising, given that 
it followed the Manchurian Incident, the consequent loss of a large part of 
Chinese territory, and took place as the delayed effects of the Great Depression, 
delayed because of China’s silver-based currency, began to affect China.  
Conclusion 
The aim of this article was to bring new quantitative evidence to bear on the 
well-established question of the nature of Nationalist governance. Goetzmann, 
Ukhov, and Zhu (2007) and Ho and Li (2014) have studied the dynamics of 
Chinese bond price fluctuations in the long term. Political and military events 
have short-term as well as long-term effects on bond prices, though, and so the 
data sample utilized for this article covers the period from 1932 to 1934, relying 
on weekly data points. Goetzmann, Ukhov, and Zhu’s argument that the 
likelihood of payment on a security fluctuates with political and military events 
affecting the security is the starting point for any argument which posits that 
bond prices can be taken as a proxy for the confidence of bondholders in the 
Nationalist Government, such as that of Ho and Li and our own. Based on that 
understanding of the meaning of bond price fluctuations, we can use the data to 
quantify the confidence of a certain segment of the Chinese population, 
bondholders, in the Nationalist Government, and to answer long-standing 
research questions such as whether the Nationalists manipulated the market in 
domestic government bonds. 
Our study of this period demonstrates the potential of this methodology to 
bring a quantitative dimension to the study of Nationalist governance during the 
entire Nanjing decade. This dimension ought to be taken into account in the same 
way that textual sources are evaluated in historiography. Much further work 
remains to be done in this vein. The second stage of our research, not yet 
undertakencompleted, will allow us to isolate the effects of concurrent 
developments in the world economy, and of speculative buying, by comparing 
our weekly time-series of the prices of Chinese Government bonds traded on the 
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Shanghai capital market with the prices of Chinese Government bonds and bonds 
of other governments traded on the London stock exchange.  
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